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This paper examines how immigrants’ migration duration and saving decisions in the host
country respond to the purchasing power parity (ppp) and the wage ratio between the host
and source countries. It is shown that in theory immigrants may stay longer in the host
country as a result of an increase in ppp, in particular those with a high willingness to
substitute consumption intertemporally. However, the empirical results from immigrants
in Germany reveal that optimal migration duration decreases in ppp. Holding individual
immigrant characteristics constant, immigrants from poorer source countries have shorter
migration duration than immigrants from wealthier source countries. The empirical results
also reveal that saving rate increases in ppp.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: F22, J61
Keywords: International Migration, Immigrant Workers1 Introduction
The immigration pressure on the developed world has been on the rise. The fraction of
immigrants in the population has increased from 9.8 percent in 1990 to 14.2 percent in 2010
in North America, and from 6.9 percent in 1990 to 9.5 percent in 2010 in Europe (United
Nations, 2009). Hatton and Williamson (2002) report that gross ﬂows have in fact increased
faster than these net ﬂows because return migration has become more common. The level of
return migration from several host countries has been quite high. For instance, while about
800,000 migrants entered Germany on average annually between 1962 and 2005, more than
560,000 left (German Federal Statistics Oﬃce).1
In this paper, the reason that immigrants return to their home countries is the higher
purchasing power of savings accumulated in the host country after returning to the home
country due to lower prices there.2 In this case, return migration can be interpreted as a
part of optimal life-cycle location decisions because at the time of the in-migration decision
immigrants know that it will be optimal for them to return after they accumulate a certain
amount of savings (Borjas, 1994). In the savings accumulation model, immigrants make joint
migration duration and saving decisions. Two key characteristics of source countries that
inﬂuence the migration duration and saving decisions of immigrants are purchasing power
parity (e.g., if purchasing power parity is 2, while a unit of savings buys one apple in the
host country, it buys two apples in the home country) and relative wages between the host
and source countries. This paper examines how purchasing power parity (ppp) and relative
wages inﬂuence immigrants’ migration duration and saving choices.
Using a model of joint consumption and migration duration decisions, I ﬁr s td e r i v ec o m -
parative statics results on the impact of ppp as well as relative wages on the optimal migration
duration and saving decisions of immigrants. Then, in the empirical part of the paper, I test
the comparative statics results obtained from the model using a rich longitudinal data set
1Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) report that of the 1971 cohort of immigrants in the U.S., the fraction that
returned by 1979 could be as high as ﬁfty percent. Aydemir and Robinson (2006) calculate an out-migration
rate of 35 percent by 20 years of residence for working-age male immigrants in Canada.
2This motivation for return migration has been used in a number of papers: Djajic, 1988; Dustmann,
1997, 2003; Stark et al., 1997.
1on immigrants from various source countries (Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Spain) in Germany.
The empirical context is appropriate for testing the hypotheses derived from the savings
accumulation model because the empirical literature has provided ample evidence on the
savings accumulation motivation for the immigrants originating from these Mediterranean
countries in Germany. Kırdar (2009), using the same data set, reports that these immi-
grants’ return realizations in fact respond to the purchasing power parity between Germany
and the source countries. If these immigrants are in Germany to save, we would expect their
saving rates to be high right after arrival. In fact, Kumcu (1989) ﬁnds quite high saving
rates for Turkish immigrants in Germany. In addition, examining Turkish return migrants
from Germany in Turkey, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) observe that very few are wage
earners and most live on their savings.
The ﬁndings of this paper within a savings accumulation model has applicability to a
much wider context as the empirical literature on migration boasts evidence that immi-
grants in several parts of the world in fact have a savings accumulation motivation. Yang
(2006) shows that return migration of Philippine migrants depends on the exchange rate
with the host countries. Massey and Espinosa (1997) ﬁnd that return migration of Mexican
immigrants in the U.S. responds to prices in Mexico.
Understanding how ppp and relative wages inﬂuence migration duration and saving
choices is important due to a number of reasons. While some immigrants originate from
poor countries, other immigrants come from countries with relatively similar characteristics
to those of the host country. For instance, are intra-European immigrants from high wage
and low ppp countries or immigrants from developing countries with low wage and high ppp
more likely to stay longer? A second reason is related to policy instruments used by some
source countries in the way of exchange rate premiums, targeted toward migrants only, to
attract more savings from them.3 To assess the impact of this policy, it is important to un-
derstand the impact of ppp on not only the saving but also the migration duration decision
of immigrants because both decisions determine the level of accumulated savings at the time
of return. Another reason is simply to understand the changes in immigrants’ behavior in
response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. How do migration duration and
3For instance, the Turkish government implemented such policies in the past.
2savings change if relative wages or the ppp between host and source countries changes as
a result of fast economic growth or an economic crisis in the source country? Purchasing
power parity ﬂuctuates over time substantially for many source countries. For instance, that
between Germany and Turkey increased by 35 percent in the aftermath of the 1994 ﬁnancial
crisis in Turkey.
The simple model I use is an extension of that used by Stark et al. (1997), which examines
the theoretical impact of ppp on optimal migration duration also in a framework of joint
consumption and migration duration decisions. Using a speciﬁc utility function in their
analysis, the logarithmic function, Stark et al. ﬁnd a negative impact of ppp on migration
duration. On the other hand, this paper allows for a more general utility function—where
there is a parameter governing the willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally—,
which yields more general comparative statics results. The key distinguishing feature of this
paper from that by Stark et al. is that it also includes an empirical section that tests the
hypotheses derived from the model.
An interesting implication of the theoretical model in this paper, not recognized by the
previous literature, is that for certain immigrants—those with a high willingness to substitute
c o n s u m p t i o ni n t e r t e m p o r a l l y — a ni n c r e a s ei np p pc a ni nf a c ti n c r e a s et h eo p t i m a lm i g r a t i o n
duration. However, numerical solutions of the model illustrate that for the range of estimated
values of elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption in the literature, the impact
of ppp on optimal migration duration would be negative. The other contribution of the theo-
retical part of this paper is that, holding individual-level characteristics constant, immigrants
who originate from poorer source countries—high ppp, low relative wage countries—would save
more in the host country than immigrants coming from relatively wealthier source countries.4
The major contribution of this paper is empirical. The previous empirical literature
has established certain causal links between the purchasing power of immigrants and their
return migration behavior.5 Yang (2006) uses exchange rate ﬂuctuations to examine the
eﬀect of migrants’ purchasing power on the return migration decision of Philippine migrants.
4In a similar vein, Galor and Stark (1990) show theoretically that immigrants would save more than the
natives as they face lower prices after returning to their home countries.
5The impact of relative prices on other decisions of immigrants has also been analyzed in the literature;
e.g., Yang (2008) measures the impact of exchange rate variations on immigrants’ remittance decisions.
3Similarly, Kırdar (2009), employing the same data set used in this study, examines the impact
of ppp on return migration realizations using duration analysis methodology. Unlike Yang
(2006) and Kırdar (2009), which use data on return migration realizations, this study uses
longitudinal information on intended migration durations.6 This longitudinal information
allows me to handle unobserved heterogeneity in immigrants’ characteristics using panel data
estimation methods, which is not the case in the other two papers. In addition, the scope of
this paper is much wider in the way that it also examines the impact of ppp on the saving
behavior of immigrants as well as the impact of relative wages between the host and source
countries on the migration duration and saving decisions.7
The empirical results reveal that the impact of ppp on optimal migration duration is
negative and large. For instance, a 10 percent increase in ppp lowers the migration duration
of a 30-year-old arriver by 28 percent. The empirical analysis also conﬁrms the negative
eﬀect of wage ratio on the optimal migration duration as predicted by the theoretical model;
however, this ﬁnding is less compelling in terms of statistical signiﬁcance. Nonetheless, the
economic signiﬁcance is large; e.g., a 10 percentage-points increase in the wage ratio decreases
the optimal migration duration of a 35-year-old arriver by 30 percent.
This paper also provides an empirical answer for the ﬁrst time, in the German context,
to an important question posed by Stark et al. (1997): are immigrants from poorer source
countries more likely to stay longer in the host country? Stark et al. (1997) claim that
immigrants originating from poorer countries may in fact stay shorter in the host country
if the impact of a higher ppp in shortening the optimal migration duration dominates the
impact of lower relative wages in lengthening the optimal migration duration. This paper
shows empirically that this is possible: immigrants facing Turkish ppp and relative wage
6The information on optimal migration duration allows me to examine the response of optimal migration
duration, rather than the return migration levels within certain periods, as it is in the other two papers, to
changes in ppp. Besides, there is both cross-sectional and time variation in ppp in this paper, whereas in
Yang (2006) there is only cross-sectional variation.
7Dustmann (2003) examines the impact of the wage diﬀerential on the optimal migration duration, using
t h es a m ed a t as e t ,a n dﬁnds that optimal migration duration may decrease as the wage diﬀerential grows.
Dustmann (2003) uses individual level wages to control for the wage diﬀerential whereas this paper examines
the impact of aggregate expected wage ratio between the host and source countries.
4values have a shorter predicted migration duration than immigrants facing the ppp and
relative wage values of wealthier EU countries in the sample, when all other characteristics
of immigrants are the same.
Finally, this is also the ﬁrst paper, to the best of my knowledge, that establishes the
causal link between ppp and immigrants’ saving behavior empirically. It is shown that ppp
has a positive impact on the saving rate, which is also large in magnitude; e.g., a 10 percent
increase in ppp increases the saving rate of a 20-year-old entrant in his ﬁrst year of residence
in Germany by 22 percent.
The next section describes the theoretical model. Section 3 explains the data set and
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 covers the estimation method and section 5
presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Basic Structure
In the optimization problem shown below, τ denotes the remaining worklife and d the du-
ration of residence in the host country. Immigrants preferences depend on consumption in
the host country (c1) and consumption in the home country after return (c2) a c c o r d i n gt oa
per-period utility function, u(.). The utility maximization problem of immigrants is subject
to a number of constraints. The ﬁrst one is a lifetime budget constraint, where p denotes the
purchasing power parity between the host and home countries, yg t h er e a lw a g er a t ei nt h e
host country, and yh the real wage rate in the home country. The second one is a minimum
consumption constraint: immigrants’ consumption in the host country cannot fall below a
minimum consumption level, denoted by cmin. Finally, duration of residence obviously has
to lie between zero and the duration of remaining worklife.
max
d, c
du(c1)+( τ − d)u(c2)
s.t. pdc1 +( τ − d)c2 ≤ pdyg +( τ − d)yh (1)
yg ≥ c1 ≥ cmin,τ ≥ d ≥ 0
In the above problem, purchasing power parity is taken to be greater than one (p>1) and
5the real wage rate in the host country is higher than the real wage rate in the home country
(yg >y h). While the former assumption is required to rationalize the return migration
decision, the latter condition is the reason why these foreign workers are in the host country.
I choose a constant relative-risk aversion utility function,
u(c)=
c
α/α α < 1,α 6=0
ln(c) α =0
(2)
because this functional form allows me to examine how the eﬀect of ppp and relative wages
on the optimal migration duration and consumption decisions of immigrants vary by the
curvature of the utility function (or by immigrants’ willingness to substitute consumption
intertemporally). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is 1/(α − 1).
2.2 Solution of the Problem
Assuming an interior optimal solution, the optimal migration duration and consumption
decision rules can be written as follows8: (At the end of this section, numerical solutions
that also allow for corner solutions are illustrated.)
d
∗ =
τ(1 − α)pα/(α−1) (yh/yg)+τ [αp − (yh/yg)]




αp1/(α−1) (pyg − yh)
(1 − α)(1 − pα/(α−1))
(4)
The above consumption decision rule gives the following optimal consumption rate.
c
∗/yg =
αp1/(α−1) [p − (yh/yg)]
(1 − α)(1 − pα/(α−1))
(5)
Both the optimal migration duration, d∗,a n dt h es a v i n gr a t e ,1 − c∗/yg,d e p e n do nt h e
wage ratio, not on the level of wages. However, the fact that we are assuming an interior
optimal point is critical here. When the minimum consumption constraint binds, not only
the wage ratio but also the level of wages would matter because in this case a higher wage
8Since the objective function is continuous and the constraint set for (d,c) is closed and bounded, there
exists an optimal solution to this problem according the Extreme Value Theorem. Moreover, since the
objective function is a strictly concave function (it is a non-negative summation of two strictly concave
functions) and the constraint set is convex, the solution is unique.
6rate in the host country also implies a higher saving ability. This would change the migration
duration as well.
2.3 Comparative Statics
Here, I investigate how optimal migration duration and consumption choices respond to
changes in purchasing power parity and relative wages.
2.3.1 Relative Wages and Optimal Migration Duration and Consumption Choices
Equations 6 and 7 give the marginals of the optimal migration duration and the optimal
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´ > 0 (7)
Proposition 1 As the ratio of home country wage rate to host country wage rate increases,
both the optimal migration duration and the saving rate in the host country decrease.
2.3.2 Purchasing Power Parity and Optimal Migration Duration and Consump-
tion Choices
The partial derivative of optimal migration duration with respect to purchasing power parity





































The sign of ∂d∗/∂p is ambiguous. While the ﬁrst two terms inside the curly brackets are
negative, the last two are positive. The numerical solutions presented later in this section
show that depending on the values of the parameters, ∂d∗/∂p can, in fact, be of either sign.
7This ﬁnding that a higher ppp implies a longer optimal migration duration in certain
cases is a new one. Stark et al. (1997) establish a negative relationship between ppp and
optimal migration duration; however, their analysis is based on a speciﬁc utility function,
the logarithmic function, whereas my analysis allows for a general type of utility function.
Equation 9 displays the partial derivative of optimal consumption in the home country
with respect to ppp. The sign of this partial derivative is not immediately obvious from the


















´2 < 0 (9)
Proposition 2 The impact of purchasing power parity on optimal migration duration can
take either sign whereas the impact of purchasing power parity on saving rate in the host
country is always positive.
Combining the positive eﬀect of a low wage ratio on the saving rate in proposition one
and the positive eﬀect of a high ppp on the saving rate in proposition two, we can reach the
following conclusion.
Corollary 3 Holding individual-level characteristics constant, immigrants’ from poorer coun-
tries —high ppp, low wage ratio—save more in the host country compared to immigrants from
relatively wealthier countries.
Special Case: yh =0 Next, I investigate how immigrants’ optimal migration duration and
consumption decisions respond to ppp when they do not intend to work as wage-earners after
returning to their home country. This restriction allows drawing more general conclusions
regarding the impact of ppp on optimal migration duration. However, it is not a restriction
made only for tractability; it has empirical relevance as well. Dustmann and Kirchkamp
(2002) report, based on a sample of Turkish return migrants from Germany in Turkey, that
less than ﬁve percent worked as wage-earners.
When immigrants do not plan to work as wage-earners in their home country after return,
the partial derivative of the optimal migration duration decision with respect to ppp is given
8in equation 10. Unlike the general case above, the partial derivative of optimal migration












´2 < 0 (10)
Proposition 4 When immigrants do not plan to work as wage-earners after returning to
their home country, optimal migration duration decreases in purchasing power parity.
2.4 Numerical Solutions
In this subsection, I provide numerical solutions to immigrants’ joint migration duration
and consumption decisions accounting for corner solutions, which are displayed in Table 1.
The wage ratio and ppp values in the table are selected to reﬂect to range of these variables
for the source countries in our sample. For the curvature parameter, alpha, a wide range
of values are taken with a focus on the range that the previous literature points out. (The
ﬁndings of this literature and their implications for my model are discussed at the end of this
subsection.) In Table 1, the ratio of the real wage rate in the home country to that in the host
country is set to 75 percent in the ﬁrst panel, to 50 percent in the second, and to 25 percent
in the third. Each panel displays how optimal consumption and migration duration change
as ppp increases for various values of alpha. Whenever the minimum consumption constraint
is binding, the optimal migration duration when the minimum consumption constraint is not
enforced is also given in parentheses.
As can be seen from Table 1, given a wage ratio, the sign of the impact of ppp on optimal
migration duration depends on the curvature parameter of the utility function (alpha). When
alpha and the wage rate in the home country are suﬃciently high, optimal migration duration
increases in ppp at certain ranges of ppp. (These are displayed in bold.) For instance, when
t h ew a g er a t ei nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yi s7 5p e r c e n to ft h a ti nt h eh o s tc o u n t r ya n da l p h ai s0 . 7
or higher, the optimal migration duration increases in ppp. One could wonder if this arises
due to the imposition of the minimum consumption constraint because wherever ∂d∗/∂p is
positive in Table 1, the minimum consumption constraint binds. However, an examination of
the optimal migration durations when the minimum consumption constraint is not imposed
9reveals that the fact that ∂d∗/∂p is positive at certain ranges of ppp when alpha is high
enough still holds. In fact, it now widens in terms of the range of the wage rate in the home
country after return: a positive ∂d∗/∂p is observed in the second and third panels of Table 1
(where the wage ratio is 0.5 and 0.25, respectively) as well. However, for many other values
of alpha and the wage ratio, the eﬀect of ppp on optimal migration duration is negative.
This conﬁrms that the interior solution characterization of ∂d∗/∂p in equation 8, in fact,
takes either sign.
The eﬀect of ppp on optimal migration duration is positive only for very high alpha, i.e.
when willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally is also high. Using a structural
dynamic model of return migration and saving decisions for the same group of immigrants,
Kırdar (2004) estimates an alpha parameter around 0.6. This estimate implies a higher
willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally compared to typical estimate of alpha
in the literature.9 However, even for this high level of willingness to substitute consumption
intertemporally, as can be seen from Table 1, the impact of ppp on optimal migration
duration is negative for the full range of wage ratio values for the source countries in our
sample.
2.4.1 Interpretation
Here, I provide intuition on the comparative statics ﬁndings regarding the eﬀects of ppp and
relative wages on optimal migration duration and consumption choices as well as on how
these eﬀects are inﬂuenced by alpha, the parameter that determines immigrants’ willingness
to substitute consumption intertemporally.
There are two separate eﬀects of increasing ppp. On one hand, the value of accumulated
9Note that alpha that Kırdar (2004) estimates is high compared to the typical value in life-cycle consump-
tion literature, which is around -2 (Hubbard et al., 1994). However, a number of recent empirical papers
(Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Imai and Keane, 2004; Sauer, 2004) estimate a much higher alpha parameter,
similar to that in Kırdar (2004), and, therefore, a higher willingness to substitute consumption intertem-
porally. Keane and Wolpin (2001) claim that normally a high level of prudence is needed so that young
people do not borrow despite a rising lifetime income; however, when there are borrowing constraints—as it
is in their paper as well as in Kırdar (2004)—a high level of prudence may not be needed. In fact, based on
experimental studies that estimate risk aversion, Gooree et al. (2003) also estimate alpha around 0.5.
10savings after returning to the home country increases; therefore, immigrants want to spend
a larger fraction of their worklife in their home country (income eﬀect). On the other
hand, the returns to staying longer in Germany and accumulating more savings, i.e. the
opportunity cost of return, also increase (substitution eﬀect). According to Table 1, while the
substitution eﬀect dominates for immigrants who are very willing to substitute consumption
intertemporally, the income eﬀect dominates for the rest. Immigrants who are more willing
to substitute consumption intertemporally are, by deﬁnition, more patient about saving in
the host country in order to enjoy its beneﬁts in the form of high consumption after return.
Therefore, the increase in the opportunity cost of return due to a higher ppp is larger for
them, which makes it possible for them that migration duration increases in ppp.
In addition, there is the indirect eﬀect resulting from the change in consumption behavior.
A higher ppp increases savings in the host country. As a result, immigrants accumulate
savings faster and the eﬀect of increased ppp in rising consumption after return (income
eﬀect) becomes stronger. This indirect eﬀect, which decreases optimal migration duration,
is weaker for immigrants who are more willing to substitute consumption intertemporally
because ﬁrst these immigrants already save more (due to their higher willingness to substitute
consumption intertemporally), therefore there is less room for an increase in their savings;
second, again due to their already high saving rates, the minimum consumption level binds
immediately, therefore it is less likely that their saving behavior will change at all.
Another important fact in Table 1 is that a positive eﬀect of ppp on migration duration
is more likely when the home country expected wage rate is higher. As illustrated in the
model, as the home country expected wage rate increases, optimal migration duration de-
creases. Therefore, for a given value of the curvature parameter, immigrants who face higher
earnings in their home country return earlier with lower savings. As a result, the income
eﬀect resulting from a higher ppp is weaker for them. Moreover, since they face a longer
duration of time in their home country after return, the substitution eﬀect is stronger for
them. In addition, conditional on the curvature parameter and ppp, the minimum consump-
t i o nl e v e li sm o r el i k e l yt ob eb i n d i n gw h e nt h ee x p e c t e dw a g er a t ei nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yi s
higher. Therefore, the indirect eﬀect through consumption, which decreases optimal migra-
tion duration, is less likely to play a role in this case.
113D a t a
The data set used in this study is the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). This is a
longitudinal data set conducted every year since 1984. I use the 1984 to 2000 waves in this
study. The nice feature of this data set is that it contains an over-sampled group of immi-
grants from ﬁve diﬀerent source countries: Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy and Spain.
I do not include the ex-Yugoslavian immigrants in this study due to the split of the original
country into numerous new countries during the time frame of this study. Many of these
immigrants entered Germany in the 1960’s and 1970’s under the bilateral agreements signed
by these source country governments with the German government (guestworker recruitment
scheme). Since the ﬁrst wave of the data set is a representative sample of the stock of im-
migrants from these source countries in Germany in 1984, many of these immigrants had
already been in Germany for some time in the initial wave of the study.
The sample is restricted to households with a male household head who was 18 or older at
arrival. This age restriction is made because these immigrants must have made the initial in-
migration decision themselves given the interpretation of return migration as part of optimal
life-cycle migration decisions in the underlying model that is tested.
The variable used for measuring immigrants’ migration duration is their intended migra-
tion duration. In every survey year, immigrants are asked about how long more they are
planning to stay in Germany in number of years. This information along with the duration
of residence at the time of survey is used to generate the intended migration duration at
each survey year. When the intended age of return exceeds 65 (age of retirement), intended
migration duration is taken as the time remaining until age 65.10 Given the longitudinal
10In a setting where immigrants return to their home countries to enjoy the higher purchasing power of
savings accumulated in the host country, nobody would delay his return after the age of retirement (age 65).
Those who return after age 65 must have diﬀerent motives. Whether an immigrant stays 5 more years or
10 more years after retirement in Germany before returning cannot be explained by ppp or the wage ratio
between the countries. On the other hand, for the same immigrant, it is for sure that the values of ppp and
wage ratio were such that it was not optimal for him to return until retirement, and this information is used
in this study. The sensitivity of the ﬁndings to this restriction is tested by taking the intended migration
duration until age 70, 75, and 80; i.e. the intended duration of residence until death instead of retirement.
The qualitative ﬁndings all hold; the quantitative results regarding the eﬀect of ppp are in fact larger.
12nature of the data set, this feature allows me to follow the changes in the intended migra-
tion duration for a person over time. This is the major reason why I use data on intended
migration durations rather than realized values of this variable. Besides, migration duration
generated based on return migration realizations would be right-censored.
The data on the other decision variable, saving rate, are generated using the information
on annual savings and household income. The survey includes a question on monthly savings,
which is converted to annual level. This information on saving behavior is available only
after 1991. An important feature of the saving data is that they are censored below at zero
because only positive amount of savings are examined in the survey: the survey asks whether
immigrants saved any, and if so how much. Therefore, some of the saving values registered
as zero could, in fact, be negative.
Age and duration of residence are two important micro-level control variables used in the
estimation, which are generated using the information on year of birth and year of arrival in
Germany, respectively. A number of other individual-level characteristics are used including
nationality, educational attainment (high school and college graduation status), and whether
the household head arrived after 1973-the last year of guestworker recruitment.
Macro-level data are also used in the estimation. In fact, the two key variables in this
study are macro-level variables. Purchasing power parity and wage ratio exhibit variation
over country of origin and calendar year. In calculating the expected wage ratio, adjustments
are made for the variation in the aggregate unemployment rate and the replacement rate of
the unemployment beneﬁts in the source countries.11
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
I ﬁrst discuss the distribution of age and duration of residence at the time of arrival and in
the full sample because these variables will be critical in the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of
ppp and relative wage variables on the choice variables. Figure 1 displays, in the ﬁrst panel,
11The source for ppp data is OECD (2002a), and the source for data on replacement rates is OECD
(2002b).The wage data for the three EU countries in comparison to Germany are taken from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics webpage. The data for Turkey in comparison to Germany are taken from the
ILO webpage.
13the distribution of the age at arrival for the 828 people in the sample and the age distribution
for the 7,754 person-time observations in the full sample. These immigrants are on average
quite young at the time of arrival: the median age at arrival is 26 and 95 percent of the
immigrants are under the age of 40 at arrival. On the other hand, when we examine the age
distribution in the full sample, we see that the median age of immigrants in all observations
is much higher at 50 and that in only 15 percent of the observations are immigrants under
the age of 40. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 2 illustrates the duration of residence in the full
sample. The median duration of residence in all observations is 20 years. Only in 5 percent
of the observations, a duration of residence that is less than 10 years is reported.
The second panel of Figure 2 presents the distribution of intended migration duration.
The median intended duration of residence is 33 years. This high value is not a surprise
given the similarly high value for the median duration of residence. The more important
fact about the distribution of intended migration duration is the fraction of immigrants who
report an intention to return back before the age of retirement. Of the 827 people in the
sample, only 121 (14.6 percent) consistently report an intention of staying until retirement.
For the rest of the people in the sample, we observe variation in the intended migration
duration over time.
Figure 3 shows how intended migration duration varies according to the current duration
of residence. At arrival, intended migration duration averages at around 10 years. Intended
migration duration rises to 30 years at about 15 years of residence, and to 40 years at about
30 years of residence. (In this ﬁgure, obviously, the group of people with 15 years of residence
are diﬀerent from the group of people at arrival in that they chose to stay in Germany for
15 years.)
Figure 4 presents the mean saving rate by duration of residence. Saving rate is more
volatile over time compared to intended migration duration due to the smaller sample size.
O n eo ft h em o s ts a l i e n tf e a t u r e so ft h es a v i n gr a t ep r o ﬁle is its declining trend. Saving rate
is between 10 and 12 percent at 10 to 12 years of residence. However, it drops to a level just
above 4 percent between 20 and 25 years of residence, and it roughly stabilizes thereafter.
These saving rates are rather low, which seems to contradict the saving accumulation motive
14underlying the theoretical model.12 H o w e v e r ,w es h o u l da l s or e a l i z et h a tm o s to ft h e s e
immigrants are low-income workers with limited saving ability. More importantly, we only
observe the saving rate after 10 years of residence in Germany. However, the literature is
full of evidence of very high saving rates for these immigrants after arrival. For instance,
Paine (1974), using a study carried out by the State Planning Organization of Turkey in
1971—when all Turkish guestworkers would be in Germany for less then ten years and most
for less than four years—calculates a 36 percent saving rate. Using a similar survey, conducted
by the Central Bank of Turkey in 1986, which contains information on immigrants’ income
and savings according to their duration of residence in Germany, I ﬁnd a saving rate of 39
percent for Turkish immigrants with less than four years of residence. We could reconcile
these ﬁndings of the literature as to the high saving rates in the early years after arrival with
the relatively much lower saving rates after ten years of residence, reported in this paper as
well as in Bauer and Sinning (2005), with a declining saving rate proﬁle over time. In fact,
even after ten years of residence, there is evidence for a declining trend.
The mean values for micro-level variables by country of origin as well as for the whole
sample can be seen in Table 2. Figure 5 displays the purchasing power parities of the four
source countries with Germany from 1984 to 2000. There is substantial variation in levels
across source countries: the average ppp, over the 17 years, for Turkish immigrants is roughly
twice as much as that for Italian immigrants. The variation in ppp over time in Figure 5 is
also signiﬁcant; in fact, it is remarkable for Turkish immigrants: there were a 35 percent rise
in 1994, the year of an economic crisis, and a 34 percent rise in 1986. The expected wage
rate in the source countries as a fraction of the wage rate in Germany is illustrated in Figure
6 for the four source countries. There is substantial variation across the source countries.
While the expected wage ratio for Turkish immigrants averages at 0.25 over the 17 years,
it averages at 0.7 for Italian immigrants. The variation over time is also remarkable. For
Italian immigrants, the wage ratio in 1995 was 36 percent lower than the wage ratio in 1990.
12Bauer and Sinning (2005) ﬁnd that immigrants’ saving rate is, in fact, lower than that of natives in
Germany; however, they also report that the gap vanishes once socio-economic characteristics are accounted
for. They also ﬁnd that saving rate of immigrants who intend to return to their home country is higher.
154 Estimation
This section presents the estimation method used in testing the comparative statics impli-
cations of the theoretical model, propositions 1 and 2, regarding the eﬀects of ppp and wage
ratio on the optimal migration duration and saving decisions. According to equations 3 and
5, the optimal migration duration, d∗,a n dt h es a v i n gr a t e ,s∗, c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt h ef o l l o w i n g
functional forms.
d
∗ = d(τ,p,yh/yg;α) (11)
s
∗ = s(p,yh/yg;α) (12)
I will approximate the functional forms in equations 11 and 12 using linear models in
the estimation. According to equation 11, the optimal migration duration depends on the
remaining worklife, i.e. age at arrival, in addition to the two key macroeconomic variables
and the curvature parameter (which can not be accounted for in the estimation due to its
unobserved nature). On the other hand, saving rate depends only on the two macroeconomic
variables and the curvature parameter; it does not directly depend on the remaining worklife
as can be seen in equation 12. However, in the case that relative wages between the two
c o u n t r i e sv a r yb ya g e ,t h es a v i n gr a t ew o u l da l s ov a r yb ya g e . T h e r e f o r e ,i nt h ee m p i r i c a l
speciﬁcation, I allow the saving rate to vary by age as well.
According to the theoretical model, the impacts of ppp and wage ratio on optimal migra-
tion duration vary by the decision horizon (i.e. age at arrival), as can be seen in equations
8 and 6. On the other hand, the impacts of ppp and wage ratio on the saving rate, given in
equations 9 and 7, do not depend on the decision horizon. However, I use a more general
speciﬁcation by allowing the eﬀects of ppp and wage ratio on the saving rate to vary by age
as well.13 Therefore, the empirical speciﬁcations for migration duration and saving rate are
written in the following form.
di = β0 + β1pppi + β2pppiagei + β3wagei + β4wageiagei + β5agei + ui (13)
si = γ0 + γ1pppi + γ2pppiagei + γ3wagei + γ4wageiagei + γ5agei + vi (14)
13The main ﬁndings on saving rate are robust to this extra inclusion of age interaction terms.
16The theoretical model’s predictions are for the time of arrival in Germany and, accord-
ingly, in the above speciﬁcations, all variables are written at the time of arrival for each
person i. Therefore, ideally we would need data on intended migration duration and saving
choices at the time of arrival. However, GSOEP includes information on intended migration
duration and saving choices not at arrival but at various years after arrival. Therefore, a
time index is introduced, and the key variables of interest are interacted with duration of
residence, ti, which allows the estimation of the eﬀects of the key variables conditional on
duration on residence. The resulting speciﬁcations are given below in equations 15 and 16.
(When duration of residence, t, is zero, equations 15 and 16 reduce to equations 13 and
14, respectively.) These equations are estimated separately. In the estimation, the average
values of the last three years are used for ppp and wage ratio variables.
dit = β0 + β1pppit + β2pppitageit + β3pppitti + β4wageit + β5wageitageit (15)
+β6wageitti + β7ageit + β8ageitti + β9ti + ui
sit = γ0 + γ1pppit + γ2pppitageit + γ3pppitti + γ4wageit + γ5wageitageit (16)
+γ6wageitti + γ7ageit + γ8ageitti + γ9ti + vi
The repeated observations on intended migration duration allows estimation using a
ﬁxed-eﬀects OLS estimator. Unobserved heterogeneity could bring about biased estimates
in equation 15. For instance, age-at-arrival could be correlated with some unobserved char-
acteristic of immigrants that also has an impact on migration duration, resulting in biased
estimates. Using ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation allows elimination of any bias that could be caused
by time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by diﬀerencing them out. The speciﬁcation for
this ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation is given in equation 17, where ∆xit denotes the diﬀerence of xit
from the average of xit over time.
Since the savings data are censored below at zero, I use censored regression in the saving
rate analysis. A pooled panel data approach is taken here rather than a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel
estimation, as it is done for migration duration, because ﬁxed-eﬀects methods using dummy
variables for individuals result in convergence failures. (The sample size for saving rate is
much smaller compared to that for intended migration duration.) As time-invariant individ-
ual characteristics cannot be eliminated in this case, a number of time-invariant individual
17characteristics are also included in the regression. These include high school and college
graduation status, 1974-1983 cohort status, and country of origin. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation for
saving rate is given in equation 18, where Xit denotes the vector of individual characteristics.
∆dit = β1∆pppit + β2∆(pppitageit)+β3∆(pppitti)+β4∆wageit (17)
+β5∆(wageitageit)+β6∆(wageitti)+β7∆agei + β8∆(ageitti)+β9∆ti + ∆uit
sit = γ0 + γ1pppit + γ2pppitageit + γ3pppitti + γ4wageit (18)
+γ5wageitageit + γ6wageitti + γ7ageit + γ8ageitti + γ9ti + XitΓ + vit
Since the pooled panel data approach in the saving rate analysis cannot account for
unobserved heterogeneity, I also estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regression using the decision
to save as the left-hand-side variable, rather than the saving rate.14 This allows me to test
partially whether the ﬁndings in the censored regression for saving rate could be resulting
from the eﬀects of unobserved heterogeneity.
I check the robustness of my ﬁndings to possible omitted variables that might be corre-
lated with the key variables of interest using additional speciﬁcations. A change in ppp could
arise from events in Germany as well as the home countries. When the change arises from
an event in Germany, it is common to all observations. Moreover, this event in Germany
could change other variables that also have an impact on the dependent variable. In this
case, if these other variables are not accounted for in the regression, ppp would in part stand
for these variables, resulting in an omitted variables bias. For instance, suppose that an
economic downturn in Germany brings about a rise in prices, which would change the ppp.
This economic downturn could also cause an upsurge in the anti-immigrant sentiment in Ger-
many, which would presumably change immigrants’ migration duration and saving choices.
However, not accounting for anti-immigrant sentiment, we would mistakenly attribute any
change in immigrants’ migration duration and saving choices to the change in ppp. For this
reason, I add calendar-year dummies to equations 17 and 18 in the second speciﬁcation. This
allows me to capture the impact of ppp and wage ratio through the variation across source
14Since the censoring problem in the savings data is quite acute—roughly half of the observations are
censored—a ﬁxed-eﬀe c t sO L Se s t i m a t i o no nt h es a v i n gr a t ew o u l dl e a dt os u b t a n t i a l l yb i a s e dc o e ﬃcient
estimates.
18countries within each calendar year.
However, similarly, there may be other time-varying factors in the source countries that
are correlated with ppp or wage ratio and that also aﬀect return migration and saving
decisions. For instance, economic growth could aﬀect the currency of the home country,
and, therefore, ppp as well. At the same time, economic growth in the home country would
inﬂuence immigrants’ return decision. Therefore, not accounting for it could also cause an
omitted variable bias. For this reason, in the third speciﬁcation, I also add controls for
the growth rate in the source countries as well as its interactions with age and duration of
residence in addition to calendar year dummies to equations 17 and 18.
In all regression analyses in this study, weighted regressions are conducted using the
sampling weights provided in the survey. In the analysis of intended migration duration
using ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, sampling weights for 1984 are used because the information
comes from the variation in a person’s intentions over time. Similarly, in the ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression for the decision to save, sampling weights for 1991 are used as the savings data
are available only after this year. On the other hand, longitudinal weights are used in the
saving rate regression because in this case data from diﬀerent survey years are pooled.
The macro-level variables used in the estimation do not exhibit variation within country-
of-origin groups. Therefore, random disturbances would be correlated within these groups.
Moulton (1990) shows that even small levels of correlation could cause signiﬁcant downward
bias in the estimation of standard errors. I address this problem by clustering the standard
errors at the level of country of origin, which ensures that variance-covariance matrix is
consistent in the presence of correlation within countries. However, Bertrand et al. (2004)
and Cameron et al. (2008) report that when the number of clusters is small, even cluster-
robust standard errors may lead to downward-biased standard errors.15 Due to the small
number of clusters in my sample, I use a T-distribution rather than a standard normal
distribution in forming the signiﬁcance levels, which is suggested by Cameron et al. as a
minimum requirement for dealing with the issue of few clusters.
15Bell and McAﬀrey (2002) ﬁnd that this bias is larger when variables are relatively constant within
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for the three diﬀerent speciﬁcations explained in the previous section. Since the key variables
of interest are interacted with both age and duration of residence, the impacts of these
variables are presented in Table 4 at selected values of age and zero duration of residence.16
In other words, their eﬀects are presented at various ages at arrival for conformity with the
theoretical model.
As can be seen from Table 4, an increase in ppp lowers the optimal migration duration
in Germany. The statistical evidence is strong for most age-at-arrival groups: it is at the 5
percent level for all immigrants who arrive after age 30, and at the 10 percent level for those
w h oa r r i v eb e t w e e nt h ea g e so f2 4a n d2 9a c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst speciﬁcation.17 The negative
eﬀect of ppp on optimal migration duration is robust to the addition of calendar year dummies
as well as the controls for the home country growth rate as can be seen from speciﬁcations
two and three. Nonetheless, with these additional controls, both the magnitude of the eﬀect
of ppp and its statistical signiﬁcance diminish somewhat. That optimal migration duration
decreases in ppp is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model for the range of
values of alpha that has been estimated in the literature.
The magnitude of the eﬀect of ppp on optimal migration duration is large. According to
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, for which the statistical evidence is the strongest, a 10 percent increase
in ppp lowers the optimal migration duration by 1.34 years for a 30-year-old arriver. Since
the predicted migration duration for this immigrant is 4.8 years, when ppp and wage ratio
are set at their mean values in the sample, I can claim that a 10 percent increase in ppp
16These estimates are calculated as linear combinations of the coeﬃcients of ppp and wage ratio variables
with the coeﬃcients of their interactions with age as well as duration of residence, where duration of residence
is set at zero and age is set at various values given in the table.
17The eﬀects of ppp variable presented in Table 4 for various values of age at arrival are statistically
signiﬁcant despite the fact that the coeﬃcient of ppp variable in Table 3 is not because the coeﬃcient of the
ppp variable in Table 3 denotes its eﬀect when both age and duration of residence are set at zero.
20lowers the optimal migration duration by roughly 28 percent for this immigrant.18
This ﬁnding is diﬀerent from that in Yang (2006), where a higher ppp leads to less return
migration. However, the immigrants in that paper are shorter-term migrants on temporary
work contracts whereas the immigrants in my sample are longer term immigrants. If there
are various types of immigrants with diﬀerent return migration behavior, the composition
of the group of immigrants in my sample would be diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to fY a n g .I na d d i t i o n ,
that the immigrants in Yang’s sample have a very high willingness to substitute consumption
intertemporally and that they are more likely to be wage-earners after return—in which case
the substitution eﬀect could dominate as illustrated in this paper—could explain the diﬀerent
ﬁndings. Besides, when immigrants face a steeper rising wage proﬁle over their duration of
residence, the substitution eﬀect would be stronger. The wage proﬁle over time in the host
country could be diﬀerent for the immigrants in Yang’s sample.
In all three speciﬁcations, both the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of
ppp on migration duration are stronger at later ages. For immigrants who plan to stay in
Germany throughout their lives, a change in ppp would not make a diﬀerence in the migration
duration. Since immigrants who are younger at arrival are more likely to stay in Germany
throughout their lives (see, e.g., Dustmann [1996]), their optimal migration duration would
be less sensitive to changes in ppp. In addition, for immigrants who are older at arrival, the
substitution eﬀect—the increase in the value of foregone savings opportunities by returning
home when ppp increases—is smaller due to a shorter remaining worklife.
The eﬀect of wage ratio on the optimal migration duration decision has a negative sign
as predicted by the theoretical model. This negative eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level for those who arrive at or after age 32 according to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation.
18Note that the predicted migration duration at 4.8 years for 30-year-old arrivers is shorter compared to
the intended duration residence for new arrivers (with zero duration of residence) in Figure 3. However,
the mean age-at-arrival value for those new arrivers in Figure 3 is about 20. For 20-year-old arrivers, the
predicted migration duration from speciﬁcation one is 6.3 years, which is still smaller. The key reason to this
discrepancy is that in Figure 3, the data are really sparse for more recent arrivers (at low values of duration
of residence). Therefore, the predictions of the model reﬂect more of the behavior of immigrants with longer
duration of residence and match less well with the behavior of more recent arrivers in Figure 3. That the
eﬀects of the variables of interest are linear in duration of residence is also important here.
21When we add additional controls in speciﬁcations two and three, the statistical signiﬁcance is
lost. However, this does not arise from a lower estimate of the coeﬃcient due to a correction
of a potential omitted variable bias—the coeﬃcient estimates change little—, but from much
less precisely estimated parameters. Despite the relatively low statistical signiﬁcance, the
economic signiﬁcance of the wage ratio variable is high. A 10 percentage points increase in
the wage ratio (e.g. expected wage rate in the source country rises to 50 percent of that in
Germany from 40 percent) for a 35-year-old arriver decreases the optimal migration duration
by 1.22 years, which implies a 30 percent fall from the predicted level of 4.04 years.
5.1.1 Who would stay longer: immigrants from poorer or relatively wealthier
source countries?
The above ﬁndings imply that immigrants from poorer countries may, in fact, stay shorter
in the host country if the impact of a higher ppp in decreasing migration duration dominates
the impact of a lower wage ratio in increasing migration duration. To examine this, pre-
dicted migration durations are calculated for selected values of ppp and wage ratio, which
are presented in Table 5.19 Conditional on ppp, as expected from the estimation results,
immigrants from poorer countries (lower wage ratio) stay longer. However, when we allow
the poorer countries to have a higher ppp, as it actually is, the gap diminishes substantially;
and, in fact, in many reasonable cases, immigrants from poorer countries stay shorter. For
instance, a 20-year-old immigrant coming from a source country for which the wage ratio is
0.25 and ppp is 2 (wage ratio at ppp is 0.5) would stay shorter, 7.3 years, than an immigrant
originating from a wealthier source country for which the wage ratio is 0.5 and ppp is 1.5
(wage ratio at ppp is 0.75), who would stay for 8.0 years. Moreover, as immigrants’ age at
19The eﬀects of the key variables of interest are identiﬁe dt h r o u g ht h et i m ev a r i a t i o ni nt h e s ev a r i a b l e s
in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model. However, the intercept term—which is the average of ﬁxed eﬀects—depends on
the levels of these key variables as well. Therefore, the predicted values of optimal migration duration are
aﬀected by the time variation in the key variables as well as by their levels (cross-sectional variation). Note
that the addition of grand means (averages over time and person) of all variables to equation 17 allows the
estimation of this intercept term. In addition, the results of a random-eﬀects estimation method, in which
the eﬀects of key variables would depend on between as well as within variation, show that the key ﬁndings
in this section still hold.
22arrival increases, that immigrants from poorer countries stay shorter becomes more likely.
For instance, for the same two countries in the previous example, a 30-year-old arriver from
the wealthier one would stay for 6.8 years, whereas the one from the poorer country would
stay for 5.9 years.
Next, I examine the predicted migration durations according to the ppp and wage ratio
values for the four source countries in my sample. These are given in Table 6, according
to all three speciﬁcations used in the estimation, for immigrants who arrive in Germany at
ages 20, 30, and 40, separately. The major result is that the predicted migration duration of
an immigrant facing Turkish ppp and wage ratio values is shorter than those of immigrants
facing ppp and wage ratio values of EU countries for all three age-at-arrival groups. In other
words, the shortest intended migration duration occurs when the ppp and wage ratio values
are taken for the poorest country in the sample. Moreover, as age-at-arrival increases, this
ﬁnding becomes even stronger in magnitude.
This ﬁnding that the intended migration duration of immigrants facing Turkish values
for ppp and wage ratio is shorter may be surprising at ﬁr s tb e c a u s et h el i t e r a t u r ei sf u l lo f
evidence on the fact that actual return rates of Turkish immigrants are in fact lower. My
predictions are based on varying ppp and wage ratio levels holding everything else constant.
However, the literature also reports that Turkish immigrants are diﬀerent in terms of certain
individual characteristics that inﬂuence return migration decisions.20
5.2 Savings
5.2.1 Censored Regression Analysis of Saving Rate
Table 7 presents the censored regression estimation results for saving rates.21 Due to the
age and duration of residence interaction terms of the key variables, their impacts on the
saving rate are presented separately in Table 8 at selected values of age and zero duration
of residence (i.e. at arrival in Germany).
Purchasing power parity has a positive impact on the saving rate, as implied by the
theoretical model. While the statistical signiﬁc a n c ei sa tt h e1 0p e r c e n tl e v e lf o ra l la g e
20See, for instance, Kırdar (2009).
21Interpretation of censored regression estimates are similar that of OLS estimates.
23groups in speciﬁcation one, it is much stronger in speciﬁcations two and, especially, three.
With regard to the impact of wage ratio on the saving rate, however, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant evidence.22
The magnitude of the eﬀect of ppp on saving rate is large. According to speciﬁcation
three, for which the statistical signiﬁcance is the highest for all age groups, a 10 percent rise
in ppp increases the saving rate of a 20-year-old arriver in his ﬁrst year of residence by 5.1
percentage points. Given the fact that the predicted saving rate in the ﬁrst year of residence
for this immigrant—when all other variables are set to mean values—is 23.1 percent, a 10
percent rise in ppp brings about a 22 percent increase in the saving rate. The magnitude
of the impact of ppp on saving rate for immigrants arriving at later ages is even larger. A
10 percent increase in ppp rises the saving rate by 26 percent in his ﬁrst year of residence
for a 30-year-old arriver (5.4 percentage points increase from a predicted saving rate of
21.1 percent) and by 30 percent in his ﬁrst year of residence for a 40-year-old arriver (5.7
percentage points increase from a predicted saving rate of 19.2 percent).
The predicted saving rates during the ﬁrst year of residence at 23.1 percent for a 20-year-
old arrriver, at 21.1 percent for a 30-year-old arriver, and at 19.2 percent for a 40-year-old
arrriver are much higher than the mean saving rate given in Table 2. However, the saving
rate given in Table 2 is the average of saving rates at various duration of residence values,
whose distribution is shown in Figure 2, whereas the predicted saving rates are at the time
of arrival. In fact, Kırdar (2004) estimates a downward-sloping saving proﬁle for the same
group of immigrants in Germany, which is consistent with the ﬁnding here that predicted
saving rates at the time of arrival are much higher.
5.2.2 Fixed-Eﬀe c t sO L SR e g r e s s i o nA n a l y s i so ft h eD e c i s i o nt oS a v e
Next, I concentrate on the binary decision to save, ignoring the level of savings when the
decision is to save, because this allows me to estimate a ﬁxed-eﬀects model (unlike the case
22In a ﬁxed-eﬀects OLS estimation that does not account for censoring, the standard errors of the key
variables of interest, compared to those in the censored regression model without ﬁxed eﬀects, are in fact
noticeably smaller in speciﬁcations one and two and very similar in speciﬁcation three; however, the coeﬃcient
estimates are much smaller (as expected when censoring is not accounted for).
24for saving rate). The ﬁxed-eﬀects OLS estimation results for this decision are given in Table
9a n dt h ee ﬀects of ppp and wage ratio on this decision at the time of arrival for selected
values of age-at-arrival are presented in Table 10, for the three speciﬁcations.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst speciﬁcation, there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence that immi-
grants who are 30-years-old or older at arrival are in fact more likely to save when ppp is
higher, which supports the ﬁnding in the previous subsection. A 10 percent rise in ppp
increases the probability of saving by 3.4 percentage points for 30-year-old arrivers, and by
6.1 percentage points for 40-year-old arrivers. As we add year dummies in speciﬁcation two,
standard errors grow substantially and, therefore, any claim to statistical signiﬁcance is lost.
There is no statistical evidence on the eﬀect of wage ratio on the saving decision, as it was
for the saving rate in the previous subsection.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper examines the impact of purchasing power parity and relative wages between the
host and source countries on immigrants’ migration duration and saving decisions by ﬁrst
developing a simple theoretical framework that allows for heterogeneity among immigrants
according to their willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally and then testing
the comparative statics implications of this framework using a longitudinal data set on
immigrants in Germany from four diﬀerent source countries.
The theoretical model predicts that a higher ppp can in fact increase the optimal migra-
tion duration under certain conditions. In particular, this is the case for immigrants who
would earn relatively high wages in their home country after return and whose willingness
to substitute consumption intertemporally is high. However, for the values of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution of consumption uncovered by the previous literature, the sim-
ulation results of the theoretical model reveal that the eﬀect of ppp on migration duration
would be negative. In the special case that immigrants do not work as wage earners after
returning to the home country, optimal migration duration decreases in ppp for all values
of the parameters. Another important implication of the theoretical model is that immi-
grants originating from poorer source countries would save more in the host country than
25immigrants coming from relatively wealthier source countries.
The empirical analysis reveals that ppp has a negative impact on optimal migration
duration. The magnitude of this impact is also large; e.g., a 10 percent increase in ppp
lowers the predicted migration duration at the time of arrival by roughly 28 percent for an
immigrant who arrives in Germany at the age of 30. The magnitude of this impact is even
larger for immigrants who arrive at later ages. This paper also provides suggestive but not
compelling empirical evidence, due to relatively low statistical signiﬁcance, that the optimal
migration duration decreases as the expected wage rate in the home country increases relative
to that in the host country, which is consistent with the implication of the theoretical model
on this matter.
These empirical ﬁndings also imply that immigrants from poorer countries may, in fact,
stay shorter in the host country. For instance, the estimates reveal that an immigrant coming
from a source country where the expected wage rate is 25 percent of that in Germany and
the ppp is 2 (wage ratio at ppp is 0.5) would stay shorter than immigrant originating from a
country for which the wage rate is 50 percent of that in Germany and the ppp is 1.5 (wage
ratio at ppp is 0.75). To be more speciﬁc, an immigrant facing Turkish ppp and relative
wages would stay shorter in Germany than an immigrant facing ppp and wage ratio values
of the wealthier three EU countries in the sample, regardless of age-at-arrival.
The empirical analysis also conﬁrms the positive impact of ppp on saving rate, as implied
by the theoretical model, for all age-at-arrival groups. For instance, a 10 percent rise in ppp
increases the saving rate by 22 percent in the ﬁrst year of residence for a 20-year-old arriver.
This ﬁnding implies that exchange rate premium policies implemented by source country
governments would encourage these immigrants to save more. However, since this policy
would at the same time shorten the optimal migration duration, the amount of accumulated
savings that would return to the home countries along with the migrants could in fact fall.
An important issue is obviously the transferability of the empirical ﬁndings of this paper
to other geographical settings at diﬀerent times. The empirical results of this paper are
for temporary migrants who are in the host country to accumulate savings. This type of
migration has been prominent historically, in particular the large guestworker recruitment
schemes in Europe after the World War II, in a period of rapid economic expansion. Similar
26temporary labor migration policies have been used in the Gulf countries, which drew massive
migration from other Middle Eastern and Asian countries in a period of rising oil revenues.
Similar temporary-worker programs have also been proposed in the U.S.. Birdsall et al.
(2005) outline how such temporary migration could help both the developing and developed
countries. Therefore, the type of migration on which the empirical results of this paper are
based on is still important and likely to stay that way, in particular in periods of economic
expansions in developed countries.
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30Table 1: Numerical Solutions to Immigrants’ Joint Consumption and Migra-
tion Duration Decisions
wage ratio = 0.75
ccccc
alpha = 0.9 0.50 35.35 (32.96) 0.50 35.52 (33.24) 0.50 35.64 (33.67) 0.50 35.77 (34.30) 0.50 35.85 (34.67)
alpha = 0.7 0.74 33.77 0.50 29.47 (29.41) 0.50 29.60 (27.73) 0.50 29.71 (26.60) 0.50 29.73 (26.34)
alpha = 0.6 0.90 36.67 0.65 30.25 0.51 27.53 0.50 27.37 (25.27) 0.50 27.36 (24.39)
alpha = 0.5 1.00 40.00 0.76 31.67 0.63 28.00 0.50 25.35 (24.76) 0.50 25.30 (23.33)
alpha = 0.1 1.00 40.00 0.99 39.35 0.87 32.36 0.73 25.89 0.64 22.81
alpha = -1 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 0.95 34.55 0.89 27.97
wage ratio = 0.5
ct ct ct ct c t
alpha = 0.9 0.50 36.73 (34.96) 0.50 36.67 (34.64) 0.50 36.62 (34.74) 0.50 36.54 (35.01) 0.50 36.49 (35.20)
alpha = 0.7 0.99 39.77 0.62 33.61 0.50 31.77 (30.93) 0.50 31.44 (28.74) 0.50 31.19 (27.94)
alpha = 0.6 1.00 40.00 0.81 35.85 0.62 31.79 0.50 29.46 (28.13) 0.50 29.12 (26.52)
alpha = 0.5 1.00 40.00 0.95 38.67 0.75 33.33 0.53 28.33 0.50 27.32 (26.00)
alpha = 0.1 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 0.83 32.32 0.71 27.61
alpha = -1 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 0.99 38.64
wage ratio = 0.25
ct ct ct ct c t
alpha = 0.9 0.50 37.46 (36.16) 0.50 37.34 (35.57) 0.50 37.23 (35.50) 0.50 37.07 (35.57) 0.50 36.95 (35.64)
alpha = 0.7 1.00 40.00 0.74 36.41 0.51 33.22 0.50 32.66 (30.41) 0.50 32.28 (29.25)
alpha = 0.6 1.00 40.00 0.98 39.58 0.72 34.84 0.50 30.93 (30.35) 0.50 30.43 (28.27)
alpha = 0.5 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 0.88 37.14 0.60 31.11 0.50 28.83 (28.18)
alpha = 0.1 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 0.93 37.32 0.78 31.54
alpha = -1 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00 1.00 40.00
tt
Notes: c denotes consumption, t denotes migration duration. Values inside the parantheses are optimal migration durations when the minimum 
consumption constraint is not enforced. Duration of residence is given in bold when it increases in ppp. Wage ratio and ppp values are selected 
according to the actual values for the source countries in the empirical section. The values of alpha focus on the range that is uncovered by the 
previous literature.
ppp=2.5
ppp=3 ppp=1.5 ppp=1.75 ppp=2 ppp=2.5
ttt
ppp=3
ppp=1.5 ppp=1.75 ppp=2 ppp=2.5 ppp=3
ppp=1.5 ppp=1.75 ppp=2
Table 2: Table of Means for Micro Variables
Turkish Greek Italian Spanish Total
Intended Duration of Residence 32.12 32.69 35.72 35.94 33.35
Saving Rate (%) 5.14 8.09 5.36 11.53 5.83
Current Duration of Residence 20.77 22.82 23.08 24.59 21.82
Age 48.17 49.39 47.38 49.70 48.21
High School Graduate 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.18
College Graduate 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.05
Cohort 1974-1983 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.02 0.18
Number of People 312 156 212 148 828
Number of Obs in Panel 3,137 1,468 1,997 1,152 7,754
31Table 3: Fixed-Eﬀects OLS Estimates for Intended Migration Duration
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Log(PPP) -8.271 -2.724 -0.481
[9.158] [7.587] [6.093]
Log(PPP) * Age -0.171 -0.223 -0.254
[0.188] [0.176] [0.136]
Log(PPP) * Dur. of Res. 0.643* 0.632 0.652
[0.230] [0.292] [0.281]
Wage Ratio -8.719 -7.335 -5.187
[7.667] [9.769] [10.944]
Wage Ratio * Age -0.099 -0.113 -0.172
[0.086] [0.107] [0.126]
Wage Ratio * Dur. of Res. 0.376 0.594 0.668
[0.252] [0.450] [0.376]
Dur. of Residence 2.312** 2.229** 2.321**
[0.508] [0.599] [0.617]
Age * Dur. of Residence -0.029** -0.028** -0.029**
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Home Country Growth Rate 1.149
[0.996]
Home Country Growth Rate * Age -0.022
[0.021]
Home Country Growth Rate * Dur. Of Res. 0.001
[0.012]
Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 6782 6782 6782
Number of persnr 820 820 820
R-squared 0.232 0.238 0.239
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of country of origin.
Macro variables are three-year moving averages.
Dependent Variable: Intented Migration Duration
32Table 4: Impacts of PPP and Wage Ratio on Intended Migration Duration
at Arrival
Age at Arrival Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
20 -11.696 5.699 -7.182 4.333 -5.564 4.004
25 -12.553 4.905 * -8.296 3.598 -6.835 3.614
30 -13.410 4.172 ** -9.410 2.944 ** -8.105 3.319 *
35 -14.266 3.538 ** -10.525 2.438 ** -9.376 3.146 *
40 -15.123 3.065 ** -11.639 2.182 ** -10.647 3.114 **
45 -15.979 2.836 ** -12.753 2.265 ** -11.918 3.228 **
Age at Arrival Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
20 -10.691 5.960 -9.604 7.807 -8.621 8.551
25 -11.184 5.534 -10.172 7.332 -9.480 7.964
30 -11.677 5.108 -10.739 6.866 -10.339 7.384
35 -12.170 4.683 * -11.306 6.410 -11.197 6.813
40 -12.663 4.259 * -11.873 5.967 -12.056 6.253
45 -13.156 3.837 ** -12.441 5.540 -12.914 5.707
A T(3) distribution is used in forming the significance levels.
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Effect of Wage Ratio
Effect of Log(PPP)
33Table 5: Predicted Intended Migration Durations at Arrival according to
Purchasing Power Parity and Wage Ratio
1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5
Age at arrival = 20
Wage Ratio = 0.75 7.44 5.31
Wage Ratio = 0.5 10.12 7.99 6.17 4.61
Wage Ratio = 0.25 12.79 10.66 8.85 7.29 5.91 4.68
Age at arrival = 30
Wage Ratio = 0.75 6.32 3.88
Wage Ratio = 0.5 9.24 6.80 4.73 2.94
Wage Ratio = 0.25 12.16 9.72 7.64 5.86 4.28 2.87
Age at arrival = 40
Wage Ratio = 0.75 5.20 2.45
Wage Ratio = 0.5 8.37 5.61 3.27 1.26
Wage Ratio = 0.25 11.53 8.78 6.44 4.42 2.64 1.05
PPP
Notes: Estimates are based on the parameters in specification 1 in Table 3. Duration of residence is set at zero. All other 
variables are set at their mean values.
Table 6: Predicted Intended Migration Durations according to Actual Values
of PPP and Wage Ratios for the Four Source Countries in the Sample
20 30 40 20 30 40 20 30 40
Turkish 5.19 3.45 1.71 6.70 4.50 2.29 7.85 4.63 1.40
Greek 9.29 8.18 7.08 8.65 7.20 5.75 7.87 5.91 3.95
Italian 8.70 7.73 6.76 7.15 5.96 4.77 7.16 5.04 2.93
Spanish 10.07 9.17 8.27 8.84 7.73 6.61 9.13 7.08 5.04
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Notes: Estimates are based on the parameters in Table 3. Duration of residence is set at zero and all other variables are set 
at their mean values. In specification 3, source country growth rate is set at the country specific mean value and interacted 
with age accordingly.
Age at Arrival Age at Arrival Age at Arrival
34Table 7: Censored Regression Estimates for Saving Rate
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Log(PPP) 0.245 0.334*** 0.453***
[0.155] [0.089] [0.138]
Log(PPP) * Age 0.003 0.005 0.003
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
Log(PPP) * Dur. of Res. -0.019*** -0.026*** -0.024***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
Wage Ratio 0.368 0.333 0.466
[0.379] [0.269] [0.341]
Wage Ratio * Age -0.004 0.000 -0.001
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Wage Ratio * Dur. of Res. -0.008 -0.021** -0.022***
[0.007] [0.011] [0.008]
Dur. of Residence -0.006 0.009 0.011
[0.014] [0.017] [0.014]
Age -0.004 -0.006* -0.007
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
Age * Dur. of Residence 0.000* 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
High School Graduate 0.006 0.003 0.004
[0.028] [0.026] [0.027]
College Graduate 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.056***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.020]
1974-83 Arrival Cohort -0.081** -0.066 -0.068
[0.035] [0.043] [0.043]
Greek 0.038*** 0.056* 0.060**
[0.008] [0.030] [0.028]
Italian -0.027 0.079* 0.075*
[0.033] [0.042] [0.043]
Spanish 0.069*** 0.133*** 0.144***
[0.009] [0.037] [0.026]
Home Country Growth Rate -0.04
[0.040]
Home Country Growth Rate * Age 0.001
[0.001]
Home Country Growth Rate * Dur. Of Res. -0.002***
[0.001]
Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 2418 2418 2418
The dependent variable is censored below at zero.
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of country of origin.
Macro variables are moving averages of the last three years.
Dependent Variable: Saving Rate
35Table 8: Impacts of PPP and Wage Ratio on Saving Rate at Arrival
Age at Arrival Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
20 0.297 0.112 * 0.435 0.109 ** 0.509 0.113 **
25 0.311 0.108 * 0.460 0.123 ** 0.523 0.113 ***
30 0.324 0.107 * 0.486 0.138 ** 0.537 0.115 ***
35 0.337 0.110 * 0.511 0.155 ** 0.551 0.120 ***
40 0.350 0.115 * 0.536 0.173 * 0.565 0.127 **
45 0.363 0.124 * 0.562 0.191 * 0.579 0.135 **
Age at Arrival Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
20 0.295 0.318 0.327 0.255 0.442 0.263
25 0.277 0.307 0.325 0.258 0.435 0.249
30 0.259 0.298 0.323 0.262 0.429 0.239
35 0.241 0.291 0.322 0.268 0.423 0.234
40 0.223 0.286 0.320 0.277 0.417 0.232
45 0.205 0.285 0.319 0.287 0.411 0.235
These estimates are linear combinations of the estimators in censored regression presented in Table 7.
A T(3) distribution is used in forming the significance levels.
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.
Effect of Log(PPP)
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Effect of Wage Ratio
36Table 9: Fixed-Eﬀects OLS Estimates for the Decision to Save
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Log(PPP) -0.471** -0.015 -0.023
[0.136] [0.683] [0.752]
Log(PPP) * Age 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.043***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
Log(PPP) * Dur. of Res. -0.040* -0.052 -0.078
[0.014] [0.027] [0.036]
Wage Ratio -1.771 -1.284 -1.256
[1.373] [1.860] [2.179]
Wage Ratio * Age 0.071*** 0.069** 0.092**
[0.011] [0.016] [0.020]
Wage Ratio * Dur. of Res. -0.084 -0.102 -0.143
[0.036] [0.059] [0.068]
Dur. of Residence -0.095** -0.073 -0.055
[0.026] [0.044] [0.057]
Age * Dur. of Residence 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Home Country Growth Rate -0.149**
[0.043]
Home Country Growth Rate * Age 0.005*
[0.002]
Home Country Growth Rate * Dur. Of Res. -0.005
[0.003]
Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 2423 2423 2423
Number of persnr 403 403 403
R-squared 0.045 0.049 0.056
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of country of origin.
Macro variables are moving averages of the last three years.
Dependent Variable: Positive Savings or Not ({0,1})
37Table 10: Impacts of PPP and Wage Ratio on the Decision to Save
Age at Arrival Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
20 0.069 0.130 0.554 0.755 0.841 0.844
25 0.204 0.136 0.696 0.774 1.057 0.868
30 0.339 0.145 * 0.838 0.792 1.273 0.893
35 0.475 0.155 * 0.980 0.811 1.489 0.918
40 0.610 0.168 ** 1.122 0.830 1.705 0.944
45 0.745 0.182 ** 1.264 0.848 1.921 0.970
Age at Arrival Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
20 -0.345 1.147 0.105 1.552 0.575 1.786
25 0.011 1.090 0.452 1.475 1.033 1.688
30 0.368 1.034 0.799 1.400 1.490 1.590
35 0.724 0.978 1.146 1.324 1.948 1.492
40 1.081 0.922 1.493 1.250 2.406 1.395
45 1.437 0.865 1.840 1.176 2.863 1.299
These estimates are linear combinations of the estimators in fixed-effects OLS regression presented in Table 9.
A T(3) distribution is used in forming the significance levels.
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Effect of Wage Ratio
Effect of Log(PPP)
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41A Impact of PPP on Consumption




















Here, I will show that ∂c∗/∂p < 0. This will be done separately for positive alpha, negative alpha, and alpha
equal to zero.
a) α>0
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Since yh is non-negative, I need to show that 1 − αp + p
α
α−1(α − 1) is non-positive. For this purpose, I
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α−1(α−1) is a decreasing function of p. When p
is equal to 1, 1−αp+p
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α−1(α−1) = 1−α+(α−1) = 0. Since p is greater than 1,
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Since yg >y h, p>0,a n dα<0,Ic a nc l a i mt h a t
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Here, I will show that
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is a non-positive number (p
1
α−1 is less than 1 as 1
α−1 is a negative
number). This means that
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is an increasing function of p. In fact, when p is equal to
1, 1−αp+p
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α−1(α−1) = 1−α+(α−1) = 0. Therefore, since p is greater than 1,
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(yh(1 + lnp) − pyg)
Since 1+l np ≤ p,a n dyh <y g, it follows that yh(1 + lnp) − pyg < 0. Therefore, ∂c∗/∂p < 0 when alpha is
equal to zero.
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